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Theory and research link social anxiety with negative self-focused attention (i.e., 
heightened preoccupation with negative thoughts, observer-perspective images, and 
somatic responses).  Negative self-focused attention, in turn, is associated with 
performance deficits on both social and non-social tasks.  However, individual 
differences in attention control have been linked with a reduction in attention biases 
associated with general anxiety.  Working memory capacity represents one construct 
theoretically and empirically linked with individual differences in attention control.  The 
current study, therefore, tested a moderated mediation model in which negative self-
focused attention was proposed to mediate the relationship between social anxiety and 
conversation performance deficits, and working memory capacity was proposed to 
moderate the relationship between social anxiety and negative self-focused attention.  
Results support the proposed model when verbal cognition (i.e., thoughts) is the target of 
negative self-focused attention.  Results were mixed for other targets of self-f cus (i.e., 
observer-perspective images, somatic responses, and general self-focus).  Clinical and 
research implications for current and future study and treatment of socialanx ety are 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Social Phobia is conceptualized as “a marked and persistent fear of social or 
performance situations in which embarrassment may occur” (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000, p. 450).  Although high levels of trait social anxiety may be associated 
with a DSM-IV diagnosis of Social Phobia, trait social anxiety can be conceptualized s 
existing on a continuum with persons throughout the population experiencing levels of 
social anxiety ranging from minimal to pathological.  The types of social situ tions feared 
by persons with high levels of social anxiety generally fall into two broad categories: 1) 
social interaction situations (e.g., participating in conversations, dating, and attending 
parties) or 2) public performance situations (e.g., speaking, eating and writi g in public; 
APA, 2000).  Whereas the subjective experience of anxiety is often similar across 
different types of social situations, studies find more convincing evidence for observable 
performance deficits in interaction versus public performance situations (e.g., Alden & 
Wallace, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Voncken & Bogels, 2008).  
Such findings corroborate descriptive data indicating that social anxiety in interaction 
situations is sometimes associated with substantial impairment in interpersonal 
functioning (e.g., successfully forming age-appropriate interpersonal relationships; e.g., 
Beidel, Turner, & Morris, 1999; La Greca & Lopez, 1998; Sanderson, DiNardo, Rapee, 
& Barlow, 1990).  
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Although a relationship exists between trait social anxiety and impairment in 
interpersonal situations, researchers continue to explore the specific cogn tive 
mechanisms underlying this relationship.  Several cognitive factors (e.g., biased 
appraisal, attention, memory, and interpretation) have been implicated in the relationship 
between trait social anxiety and interpersonal impairment (Hope, Rapee, Heimberg, & 
Dombeck, 1990; Mansell and Clark, 1999; Schofield, Coles, & Gibb, 2007; Stopa & 
Clark, 2000; Voncken, Bogels, & Peeters, 2007, see also Kimbrel, 2008 for review).  
Among these processes, however, Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that excessive self-
focused attention plays a paramount role in the performance deficits often associated with 
trait social anxiety.  
Self-Focused Attention 
 Self-focused attention has been defined as “an awareness of self-relevant, 
internally generated information that stands in contrast to an awareness of externally 
generated information” (Ingram, 1990; p. 156).  Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that, for 
persons with high levels of social anxiety, self-focused attention is characterized by a 
heightened awareness of three distinct but highly related experiences: 1) n gative 
thoughts about the self and the situation, 2) distorted images of how one appears to others
(i.e., observer-perspective images), and 3) unpleasant somatic responses (e.g., perceived 
increases in heart rate, sweating, blushing).  Clark and Wells (1995) propose that this 
heightened self-awareness may contribute to observable performance deficits uring 
social encounters.   
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Studies examining the relationship between social anxiety and self-focused 
attention generally fall into one of two categories: 1) studies examining trait self-focused 
attention (i.e., self-consciousness) and 2) studies examining state self-focused attention 
(i.e., self-awareness; see Bögels & Mansell, 2005 for review).  Trait self-focused 
attention can be defined as a dispositional tendency to focus attention on thoughts, 
images, and other self-relevant stimuli.  In general, trait self-focused attention is assessed 
using the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS, Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), which 
assesses both public and private self-consciousness.  Public self-consciousness, as 
assessed by the SCS, is conceptualized as the awareness of the self as a social object.  
Private self-consciousness is conceptualized as a general sensitivity to one’s w  
thoughts and feelings and a tendency to engage in self-reflective thinking.  Using the 
SCS, several studies have identified a positive relationship between social anxiety d 
public, but not private, self-consciousness (e.g., Bögels, Alberts, & de Jong, 1996; 
Fenigstein et al., 1975; Hope & Heimberg, 1988).  Although these studies provide 
evidence of a relationship between social anxiety and public self-focused attention, the 
reported strength of this relationship among studies varies greatly.  Specifically, reported 
correlation coefficients between measures of social anxiety and the SCS-public subscale 
range from r = .26 to r = .71 (e.g., Bogels, Alberts, & de Jong, 1996; Fenigstein et al., 
1975; Hope & Heimberg, 1988).  Additionally, questions have been raised regarding the 
factor structure and validity of the SCS, calling into question its utility as a measure of 
dispositional self-focused attention (e.g., Ruiperez & Belloch, 2003; Silvia, 1999).  
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Whereas research using the SCS suggests a relationship between social anxiety 
and trait self-focused attention, the study of state self-focused attention (i.e., situational 
shifting of attention onto thoughts, images, and other self-relevant stimuli) may provide a 
more precise understanding of the attentional processes that occur during a social 
interaction.  Studies in this area typically place participants in social-evaluative situations 
and examine the relationship between trait social anxiety and state self-focused attention.  
Findings generally indicate a relationship between social anxiety and state self-focused 
attention (e.g., Bogels & Lamers, 2002; Daly, Vangelisti, & Lawrence, 1989; Mahone, 
Bruch, & Heimberg, 1993; Mansell, Clark, & Ehlers, 2003; Perowne & Mansell, 2002; 
Stopa & Clark, 1993).  For example, Stopa and Clark (1993) had participants provide 
spoken and written transcripts of their thoughts during a role-played social situation.  
Later coding of responses indicated that persons with a diagnosis of social phobia 
disorder reported a greater number of negative self-focused cognitions than participants 
with diagnoses of other anxiety disorders and non-anxious controls.  Additionally, 
Mansell and colleagues (2003) used a novel paradigm to assess focus of attention for 
participants with either high or low levels of evaluation anxiety.  In their study, 
participants were assigned to either a threat condition (i.e., anticipating givia speech) 
or a no threat condition and then asked to complete an attention task in which they 
identified two types of stimuli.  The external stimuli involved identifying the letter “E” 
superimposed over certain faces presented on a computer screen.  The internal stimuli 
involved a vibration delivered to their fingertip that purportedly provided feedback 
regarding changes in sweating and heart rate.  Results indicated a preferential detection of 
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the internal stimuli for persons with high levels of evaluation anxiety in the threat 
condition.   
The above-noted findings provide support for the proposed relationship between 
trait social anxiety and state self-focused attention.  However, research examining the 
link between social anxiety and state self-focused attention often lacks specificity in 
assessing self-focus.  Studies in this area generally: 1) induce heightened self-awareness 
using a mirror or video camera without directly assessing self-focus, 2) use thought-
listing procedures and code reported thoughts into broad categories (e.g., internalversus 
external focus), or 3) only assess a single target of self-focus (e.g., thoughts or 
physiological responding). Whereas studies using these methods have established a 
relationship between social anxiety and a general tendency to self-focus, they have often 
failed to consider potential differences among the different targets of self-focus outlined 
in theoretical models.   
Evidence suggests that verbal-linguistic cognition (i.e., thoughts), imagery, and 
somatic responding are distinct experiences that could potentially affect cogni ive 
processing in unique ways.   For instance, Hirsch, Clark, and Mathews (2006) suggest 
that imagery and interpretation (one form of verbal-linguistic cognition) repres nt distinct 
cognitive experiences that operate reciprocally for persons with high levels of social 
anxiety.  Such a view of imagery and verbal-linguistic cognition as separable cognitive 
experiences is consistent with theory and research on the topic of pathological worry (cf., 
Borkovec, Alcaine, and Behar, 2004).   
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In addition, researchers suggest that: 1) imagery and verbal-linguistic cognition 
have differential effects on emotion (e.g., Borkovec & Inz, 1990; Freeston, Dugas, & 
Ladouceur, 1996; Holmes & Matthews, 2005), and 2) processing of imagery in visual 
short-term memory may differ from processing of language-based cognition i  verbal 
short-term memory (Andrade, Kemps, Werniers, May, & Szmalec, 2002).  Likewise, 
awareness of somatic responding is thought to represent a unique cognitive experince 
that often operates in a reciprocal manner with verbal-linguistic cognition (e.g., Borden et 
al., 1993; Hamilton, 1986; Ingram, 1990; Rachman, Levitt, & Lopatka, 1987; Stretton & 
Salovey, 1998).  For example, Borden and colleagues (1993) found panic disorder is 
associated with a shift in the content of self-focus from physiological to verbal-linguistic 
targets as task requirements change.  However, no known social anxiety research has 
simultaneously explored differential effects of negative thoughts, observer-perspective 
images, and somatic responses on performance in social interaction situations.  In 
addition, studies have not examined how individual differences in attention control might 
impact self-focus on each of these three experiences.  Consequently, the current st dy 
included exploratory analyses to examine separately the three targets of s lf-f cus 
outlined by Clark and Wells (1995). 
Effects of Self-Focus on Performance 
Persons with high levels of social anxiety are likely to experience self-focused 
attention in social situations.  However, self-focus alone may not impair performance.  In 
fact, some studies suggest that self-focused attention can facilitate performance on a 
number of tasks (see Panayiotou & Vrana, 2004 for review).  Specific individual and 
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situational characteristics such as task difficulty and self-perceived ability are important 
determinants of whether or not self-focus impairs performance.  For example, Burgio, 
Merluzzi, and Prior (1986) used scores on the Social Anxiety and Distress Scale to recruit 
a sample of “moderately socially anxious” males.  They then informed partici nts that 
the study involved participating in a getting-to-know-you telephone conversation with an 
opposite-sex stranger.  Using participants’ ratings of self-confidence about how they 
might perform on the conversation task, they classified participants as either high or low 
in success expectancy.  Finally, they assigned participants to either a high (i.e., video-
taped) or low (i.e., no video camera) self-focus condition.  Data did not support a main 
effect for self-focus condition on performance.  However, the interaction of self-focused 
attention and low expectancy for success negatively predicted observer-rated 
effectiveness during the phone conversation.   
On the surface, the findings of Burgio and colleagues (1986) seem to suggest a 
tenuous link between social anxiety, self-focus, and performance deficits.  However, a 
closer examination of the sample characteristics in the study provides a somewhat 
different picture.  The mean social anxiety score for the low expectancy group was 
significantly higher than the mean score for the high expectancy group.  In other words, 
social anxiety and low self-efficacy appear to have been highly related in hat sample.  
Other studies provide additional evidence of the negative relationship between levels of 
social anxiety and levels of social self-efficacy (e.g., Gaudiano & Herbert, 2003; Kashdan 
& Roberts, 2004; Laurenti, Bruch, & Haase, 2008).  Researchers also suggest that 
persons who experience high versus low levels of evaluation fears are more subject to 
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performance deficits associated with self-focus on laboratory task and ac demic 
examinations (e.g., Ferrari, 2001; Kurosawa & Harackiewicz, 1995; Sarason, 1988).  For 
example, Sarason (1988) implicates self-focus on worrisome cognitions as the key factor 
contributing to performance deficits among persons with high levels of test anxiey.  
Because social anxiety is associated with high levels of evaluation fears (cf., Watson & 
Friend, 1969), along with low levels of social self-efficacy, persons with high levels of 
social anxiety are likely to experience impairment related to self-focus. 
Specificity of Self-Focus 
 Apart from social anxiety, state and trait self-focus has been linked to a number of 
other psychopathological conditions including depression, panic, and alcohol abuse (e.g., 
Borden, Lowenbraun, Wolff, & Jones, 1993; see also Ingram, 1990 for review).  The 
purpose of the current investigation is to examine specifically state self-focused attention 
in the context of social anxiety.  However, due to the substantial comorbidity of social 
anxiety and depression, some mention of research examining the link between self-focus 
and depression is warranted.  As with social anxiety, depression and dysphoria are 
associated with state and trait self-focused attention (e.g., Edison & Adams, 1992; Ingram 
& Wisnicki, 1999; Sloan, 2005).  However, researchers suggest that depression is 
associated with a tendency to self-focus across contexts, whereas self-focus in social 
anxiety may occur mainly in relation to feared social or performance situations (e.g., 
Clark & Wells, 1995; Ingram & Wisnicki, 1999).  In addition, researchers link depression 
to “ruminative self-focus,” which is characterized by self-focus specifically on symptoms 
of depression and the implication of those symptoms (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  
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Consequently, self-focused attention associated with social anxiety versusd pre sion 
may differ in terms of situational specificity and distinctiveness of content. 
Summary of Self-Focused Attention  
Taken together, evidence suggest that persons with high levels of social anxiety
possess specific characteristics (e.g., low-self-efficacy, high fear of evaluation) associated 
with state self-focus on negative experiences (i.e., negative self-focus).  Negative self-
focus, in turn, increase the likelihood of performance deficits related to self-focus in both 
social and non-social situations.  However, Leary (1983) has noted that some persons 
with high levels of trait social anxiety do not exhibit noticeable performance deficits in 
social situations.  If negative self-focused attention impairs the performance of persons 
with high levels of trait social anxiety, then individual differences in attention control 
could be associated with a reduction in negative self-focused attention and therefore 
fewer performance deficits during social interaction situations.   
Attention Control 
At any given time, a person can be exposed to multiple internal (e.g., thoughts, 
memories, physiological reactions) and external (i.e., sights, sounds, etc.) timuli 
competing simultaneously for attention.  For persons with high levels of trait anxiety, 
stimuli capturing attention are often associated with threat (see Bar-Haim, L my, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007 for review of attention 
biases associated with anxiety).  Individual differences in attention control reflect 
variations in the ability to maintain focus on task-relevant information and/or resist 
attention capture by task-irrelevant information.  Studies examining ge eral anxiety 
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provide evidence of a negative relationship between attention control and threat-related 
attention biases on laboratory tasks (e.g., Derryberry & Reed, 2002; Reinholdt-Dunne, 
Mogg, & Bradley, 2009).  For example, Derryberry and Reed used questionnaire 
assessments of attention control (i.e., the Attention Control Scale) and trait anxiety (i.e., 
the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory) to divide participants into four groups (i.e., high 
anxious, good attention control; high anxious, poor control; low anxious, good control; 
and low anxious, poor control).  Participants then completed a reaction time task 
assessing attention biases for visually-presented threatening cues.  Results indicated that 
participants with high levels of trait anxiety and good attention control were better than 
participants with high levels of trait anxiety and poor attention control at shifting visual 
attention away from threatening locations.   
Similarly, Reinholdt-Dunne and colleagues (2009) used an objective experimental 
measure of attention control (i.e., the Attention network task; Fan, McCandliss, Sommer, 
Taz, & Posner, 2002) to examine the relationships among ge eral anxiety, attention 
control, and attention bias on the emotional Stroop task using faces and words as stimuli.  
Similar to the Derryberry and Reed (2002) results, Reinholdt-Dunne and colleagues 
(2009) found that participants with high eneral anxiety and poor attention control 
experienced significantly greater Stroop interference on the facial Stroop task than did 
participants with high general anxiety and good attention control.  However, level of 
attention control was not related to lower interference for persons with high general 
anxiety on the linguistic Stroop task.  These findings suggest that greater attention control 
may weaken the relationship between general anxiety and attention biases on laboratory 
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task.  As such, individual differences in attention control might also influence the 
relationship between social anxiety and self-focused attention during social interaction 
tasks.  
Working Memory Capacity and Executive Attention 
As reviewed above, attention control can be assessed using several different 
methodologies (e.g., the Attention Control Scale, the Attention Network Task).  
However, a growing body of literature suggests that working memory capacity represents 
a theoretically and empirically promising construct for the study of individual differences 
in attention control (see Kane, Conway et al., 2007 for review).  Current 
conceptualizations of working memory are linked to the seminal work of Baddely and 
Hitch (1974), who proposed a structural model of working memory accounting for both 
storage (via the phonological loop and viso-spatial sketchpad) and manipulation of 
information (via the central executive).  Rather than focusing solely on storage functions 
(i.e., examining the number of items that can be held in short term memory), the 
executive attention theory of working memory capacity considers the role of th central 
executive in predicting higher-order cognitive functioning.  Theoretically, two important 
tasks of the central executive are: 1) to maintain access to goal-relevant information, and 
2) to inhibit attentional capture by distracting cognitive representations.  Consequently, 
differential functioning of the central executive, as reflected in individual differences in 
working memory capacity, is thought to predict performance on complex cognitive tasks,
particularly under conditions of interference or goal conflict (Engle & Kane, 2004).   
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To assess working memory capacity, researchers typically use complex span tasks 
(e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; Daneman & Green, 1986).  Such tasks require short 
term storage of information and simultaneous processing of other information.  For 
example, one version of the reading span task requires participants to read sentnces and 
remember the last word of each sentence for later recall (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980).  
Such tasks are thought to reflect the dual functions of the Baddely and Hitch (1974) 
model (i.e., storage and executive control).  Several studies using a variety of span tasks 
have found evidence supporting the proposed relationship between working memory 
capacity and attention control (e.g., Bleckley, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 
2003; Conway, Cowan, & Bunting; 2001; Kane, Brown et al., 2007; McCabe, Roediger, 
McDaniel, Balota, & Hambrick, 2010; McVay and Kane, 2009; Poole & Kane, 2009; see 
also Kane, Conway et al., 2007 for review).  Several such studies provide specific 
evidence for a relationship between working memory capacity and the inhibition of 
distracting stimuli (e.g., Conway, Cowan, & Bunting; 2001; Kane, Brown et al., 2007; 
McVay and Kane, 2009).  For example, Conway and colleagues (2001) examined the 
relationship between working memory capacity and attentional control using a 
dichotomous listening task.  Participants assessed as either high or low in working 
memory capacity were instructed to attend to words presented in their right ear while 
ignoring distractor words presented in their left ear.  During the task, the participant’s 
name was presented in the left (i.e., distractor) ear.  Whereas previous studies using 
dichotomous listening tasks suggest that approximately 33% of participants report 
hearing their name, Conway and colleagues (2001) discovered that only 20% of their 
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high versus 65% of low working memory capacity participants reported hearing their 
name.   
McVay and Kane (2009) tested the WMC/attention control relationship using a 
sustained attention to response task (SART).  The SART encouraged habituation of a 
response (i.e., pressing a space bar for frequently presented non-targets) and tested 
reaction time and accuracy when inhibition of this prepotent response was required (i.e., 
withhold bar pressing for infrequently presented targets).  In addition, thought probes 
were presented after 60% of targets to assess focus of attention just prior to the 
presentation of the targets.  Results indicated that WMC positively predicted a curacy 
and negatively predicted fluctuations in attention (i.e., reaction time variability) on the 
SART.  Further, the relationship between WMC and performance was partially mediated 
by the proportion of task-unrelated thoughts reported on the thought probes.   
Kane, Brown, and colleagues (2007) used an experience sampling method to 
assess the relationship between working memory capacity and attentional lapses (i.e., 
mind wandering) in everyday life.  Undergraduate students were screened for l vels of 
working memory capacity and then provided with palm pilots that allowed researchers to 
query participants regarding their activities and thoughts at random times throughout the 
day.  Results indicated that high working memory capacity undergraduates experienced 
fewer lapses in attention during activities requiring concentration and effort.   
Findings from these studies demonstrate a link between working memory capacity 
and attention control.  In addition, Johnson and Gronlund (2009) provide evidence that 
individual differences in working memory capacity moderate the relationship between 
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trait general anxiety and performance on a laboratory task requiring attention control.  
Undergraduates were assessed for working memory capacity using the automated 
Operation Span Task and for trait anxiety using the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.  They 
then completed a dual-task requiring them to simultaneously complete short-term 
memory and tone-discrimination tasks.  Results indicated that working memory capacity 
moderated the relationship between trait general anxiety and accurate discrimination of 
high- versus low-frequency tones on the auditory task.  Johnson and Gronlund (2009) 
suggest that high working memory capacity may buffer the negative impact of trait 
general anxiety on performance.  However, no extant studies have specifically examined 
the potential role of working memory capacity in the relationship between social anx ety 
and self-focused attention. 
Summary  
 The previously reviewed literature suggest that: 1) persons with high levels of 
social anxiety are susceptible to state negative self-focused attention prior to and during 
social evaluative situations, 2) state negative self-focused attention is associated with 
performance deficits on social and non-social tasks, 3) higher levels of attentional control 
can reduce attention biases for persons with high levels of general anxiety, and 4) high 
versus low levels of working memory capacity are associated with greater attention 
control.  However, no research to date has specifically examined the relationships among 
trait social anxiety, working memory capacity, state negative self-focused attention, and 
performance deficits during a social interaction task. 
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Goals and Hypotheses 
 The three main goals of the current study are to: 1) test the mediational role of
negative self-focused attention in the relationship between social anxiety and 
performance deficits, 2) explore differences related to three different potential targets of 
self-focus (i.e., thoughts, observer-perspective images, and somatic responses) and 3) 
examine the possibility that high levels of working memory capacity might interact with 
trait social anxiety resulting in reduced negative self-focused attntion during an 
opposite-sex social interaction.  A hypothesized moderated mediation model predicts that 
negative self-focus will be the mechanism through which social anxiety is related to 
performance deficits during an opposite sex conversation.  In addition, the model predicts 
that the strength of the relationship between social anxiety and negative self-focus, and 
consequently between social anxiety and performance, will be weaker as levels of 
working memory capacity increase (see Figure 1 for hypothesized model).  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
 
Participants 
 
Participants were undergraduate students between 18 and 25 years of age (M = 
18.97, SD = 1.51) in the psychology pool at the University of North Carolina at 
Greensboro.  An a priori power analysis indicated that approximately 91 particin s 
would be needed to detect a medium effect size for planned analyses with a power level 
of .8 and an alpha level of .05.  Most participants (n = 95) self-selected for the study 
using the UNCG Experimetrix system.  However, a sub-sample of participants (n = 11) 
was recruited to ensure a representative number of participants with moderate to high 
levels of social anxiety.  Undergraduate students scoring at least one standard devi tion 
above the mean on the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale administered during a mass
screening procedure were contacted via telephone and invited to participate in the study.  
Of the students contacted, 11 agreed to participate and 8 completed both portions of the 
study.   
Of the 106 participants who either self-selected or were recruited for the study, 10 
did not complete the social interaction portion and were dropped from the study.  An 
additional 4 participants were not included in the final data analyses: 1 due to a previous 
relationship with one of the research assistants, 2 due to self-reported technical 
difficulties with the computerized span tasks, and 1 due to a reading span error score 
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falling more than three standard deviations from the mean.  The final sample was 
comprised of 67 females and 25 males, which is consistent with the pool of 
undergraduate psychology students from which the current sample was taken.  The self-
reported racial and ethnic composition of the sample included 61 Caucasians, 22 African 
Americans, 5 Asians, 1 Hispanic, and 4 who self-identified as “Other.”  This racialand 
ethnic composition is representative of the general undergraduate population at the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro.   
Measures 
Reading Span and Spatial Span Tasks (RSPAN & SSPAN).  Working memory 
capacity was assessed using computerized versions of the reading and spatial span t sks 
(RSPAN & SSPAN).  These tasks require participants to maintain access to memory items 
while completing unrelated processing tasks.  In RSPAN, the processing task requires 
participants to verify the semantic accuracy of simple sentences.  In SSPAN, the 
processing task requires participants to verify whether or not black-and-white matrix 
patterns are symmetrical. In both tasks, participants must respond to the verification task 
prior to a response deadline calculated from each participant’s performance during 
practice trials.  The response deadline reduces the possibility that participants will use 
extra time during the verification task to engage in mnemonic strategies (e.g., repetition) 
for the memory task.  
In RSPAN, a capital letter (randomly selected among 12) appeares for 250 ms, 
200 ms after the reading verification or response deadline. After 3–7 sentence-letter pairs, 
all 12 letters appear onscreen and participants use the mouse to identify the presented 
 
 18 
  
letters in serial order. In SSPAN, one square of a 4 x 4 grid is shaded red for 650 ms, 200 
ms after either symmetry verification or response deadline. After 2–5 symmetry–grid 
pairs, subjects recall the locations of the colored squares in serial order by mouse clicking 
on an empty grid. The tasks present each set length (3–7 in RSPAN; 2–5 in SSPAN) 
three times, randomly ordered across participants.  The span score on each task is the um 
of items recalled in serial position (Conway et al., 2005).   
Social Phobia Scale (SPS; Mattick & Clarke, 1998). The SPS is a well-validated 
self-report questionnaire designed to measure anxiety in public performance situations.  
The SPS contains 20 items that assess fears of being observed by others during various 
routine activities (e.g., writing in front of others, eating in front of a stranger at a 
restaurant).  Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale from 0 (“Not at all”) o 4 
(“Extremely”).  The SPS demonstrates high internal consistency (.87 to .94) and 4 to 12 
week test-retest reliability (r ranging from .66 to .93; Heimberg, Meuller, Holt, Hope, & 
Liebowitz, 1992; Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  In the current study, the SPS was combined 
with the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale to 
form a composite social anxiety score.  
Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (SIAS; Mattick & Clark, 1998). The SIAS is a 
well-validated measure that assesses anxiety in social interaction situations. The SIAS 
contains 20 items that assess fears of interacting with others (e.g., meeting people at 
parties, mixing with co-workers).  Items are rated on a five-point Likert scale from 0 
(“Not at all”) to 4 (“Extremely”).  The SIAS demonstrates high internal consistency (.86 
to .94) and 4 to 12 week test-retest reliability (r ranging from .86 to .99; Heimberg et al., 
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1992; Mattick & Clarke, 1998).  In the current study, the SIAS was combined with the 
Social Phobia Scale and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale to form a composite social 
anxiety score.   
Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (FNE; Watson & Friend, 1969).  The FNE is a 
well-validated measure that assesses the fear of being negatively evaluat d by others.  
The FNE contains 30 items rated as “True” or “False.”  Example items include “I am 
afraid that others will not approve of me” and “When I am talking to someone, I worry 
about what they may be thinking about me.”  The FNE demonstrates excellent internal
consistency and good test-retest reliability over a one-month period (r = .78).  In the 
current study, the FNE was combined with the Social Phobia Scale and the Social 
Interaction Anxiety Scale to form a composite social anxiety score.      
Focus of Attention Scale.  Clark and Wells (1995) highlight three separate targets of 
negative self-focused attention associated with social anxiety.  Specifically, they suggest 
that persons with high levels of social anxiety, when faced with a social encounter, will 
become preoccupied with: 1) somatic responses, 2) negative thoughts, and 3) distorted 
observer-perspective images.  Although verbal cognition, imagery, and somatic 
responding constitute unique cognitive and physiological processes, persons with high 
levels of social anxiety are thought to have an increased awareness of all three 
experiences during social situations.  Because no gold-standard measures of stat  self-
focused attention exist, the current investigation used a visual-analogue assessment of 
self-focus patterned after previous studies examining self-focus in socialanx ety (e.g., 
George & Stopa, 2008).  Unlike previous single-item assessments, the instrument used i  
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the current study specifically assessed each of the foci of self-focused attention outlined 
by Clark and Wells (1995). 
Immediately following the social interaction task, participants responded to items 
assessing their self-consciousness and awareness of positive and negative thoughts, 
images of how they appeared to others, and bodily sensations.  Participants rated these 
items using a visual analogue scale with anchors at 1 (Not at all) and 100 (Extremely).  
Both negatively- and positively-worded items were included to reduce possible deman  
characteristics of including only negatively-worded items.  However, because the 
literature suggests that both social anxiety and performance deficits are a sociated with 
negative versus positive self-focused attention, only the scores for the negatively-worded 
items were included in main analyses (e.g., Panayiotou & Vrana, 2004).  The structure of 
the FAS allows for assessment of the individual components of the Clark and Wells 
(1995) conceptualization of self-focus as it relates to social anxiety (i.e., preoccupation 
with negative thoughts, negative observer-perspective images, and unpleasant somatic
sensations).  In addition, two factor scores can be generated to respectively assess both 
positive and negative general self-focus; see Appendix A for a copy of the Focus of 
Attention Scale). 
Social Performance Rating Scale (SPRS; Fydrich, Chambless, Perry, Buergener, 
& Beazley, 1998).  The SPRS is a rating system for behavioral assessment of social skills 
associated with social phobia.  The SPRS was designed for use in rating participants’ 
social skills during role-played interactions with an opposite-sex confederate.  R rs 
assess participants using a five-point scale ranging from 1 (Very Poor) to 5 (Very Good) 
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across five social skills domains: 1) Gaze, 2) Vocal Quality, 3) Length, 4) Discomfort, 
and 5) Conversation Flow.  Example rating anchors from the Length domain include: 
“Monosyllabic (‘hmmm,’’yeah,’’OK’) speech turns; or responses so long that partner 
must interrupt or cannot utter reply.” (Very Poor) and “At most times, participant’s 
utterances are two or more sentences long.  Participant acknowledges partner’s remarks 
without taking over and monopolizing the conversation” (Very Good).  Similar anchors 
are provided for the remaining four domains.  In the original Fydrich and colleagues 
(1998) study, results of the SPRS were analyzed using individual domain scores and an 
overall summary score obtained by combining the five domain scores.  For the current
investigation, Length and Conversation Flow domains were used to assess conversation 
performance during the social interaction task.  Fydrich and colleagues (1998)report 
good- to excellent inter-rater reliability for domains on the SPRS (see App ndix A for 
SPRS Length and Flow coding schemes). 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 
1961). The BDI is a 21-item questionnaire used to assess symptoms of depression in 
adults. Each item offers four possible responses of increasing severity rangng in value 
from zero to three. For each item, participants identified the statement that most closely 
matches their feelings over the past two weeks. Item responses are summed to achieve an 
overall score ranging from 0 to 63, with higher scores representative of more severe 
depression. A score of 12 or higher is often considered to be indicative of moderately 
elevated symptoms of depression.  The BDI is widely used in clinical practice nd 
research and has very good reliability and validity.  In the current study, the original 
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intent for the BDI was to screen-out participants with high levels of depressive 
symptoms.  However, due the substantial overlap of social anxiety and depressive 
symptoms, scores for the BDI instead were used in supplemental analyses to detrmine 
the relative contributions of depressive symptoms and social anxiety in the prediction of 
negative self-focused attention and conversation performance deficits. 
Procedure 
Data collection was completed in two parts to avoid detrimental effects on span 
tasks performance by anticipatory anxiety regarding the social interaction task.  At the 
onset of the study, a research assistant (RA) obtained informed consent only for 
completion of working memory tasks and the BDI.  The RA then walked the participant 
through the instructions and demonstration portions of the first span task.  Span tasks 
were counterbalanced across participants, and instructions were provided separately for 
each task.  Participants completed the span tasks alone while the RA waited outside of the 
room.  Once the participant completed both span tasks, the RA administered the BDI.   
Informed consent for the second part of the study was obtained immediately 
following completion of the span tasks and questionnaires.  After obtaining consent, the 
RA administered the SPS, SIAS, and FNE.  Order of questionnaires was counterbala ced 
across participants.  Next, the RA informed the participant that the final part of the study 
involved participation in a brief role play with another research participant.  The RA then 
called another office in the building and requested that the “participant” (i.e., 
confederate) be sent over for the second portion of the study.  Confederates were always 
the opposite-sex of the participants.  When the confederate arrived, the participant and 
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confederate were seated in chairs facing each other at a 45º angle.  The RA proceeded to 
read the following script to the participant and confederate:  
 
You are going to participate in a brief video-taped role-play of a typical social 
situation that might occur between two college students.  We want you to pretend 
as if you are two college students meeting for the first time at a party or similar 
social gathering.  Your goal is to carry on a good conversation that would be 
typical of two strangers meeting for the first time.   
 
The RA next asked the participant and confederate to choose a number between 
one and ten to determine who would initiate the conversation.  The participant was 
always chosen to initiate.  The RA then informed the participant and confederate that the 
role-play would last four minute, started the video camera, and left the room.  
Confederates were trained to respond to participants in a neutral manner and to allow he 
participant to initiate conversation topics as much as possible.  Additionally, confederates 
were trained to break silences of more than approximately seven seconds with a new 
topic of conversation.   
After four minutes, the RA returned and directed the confederate back to his or 
her experiment.  The RA then provided the participant with the Focus of Attention Scale 
(FAS) to complete.  After the participant completed the FAS the RA provided a 
debriefing to explain the background and purposes of the study and to ask that the 
participant not discuss the details of the study with other UNCG undergraduate students.  
The RA also administered an oral manipulation check to assess whether or not the 
participant believed that the confederate was another study participant. 
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Video-tape Coding.  Two undergraduate research assistants (RAs) were 
independently trained to code the video-taped interactions using the Social Performance 
Rating Scale (SPRS; Fydrich et al., 1998).  Training involved first reviewing the coding 
scheme with the principal investigator and then practice coding of interactions from a 
previous study.  Once agreement was reached between the coders and the principal 
investigator on practice tapes, the first coder began rating interactions from the current 
study.  Throughout coding, interactions were periodically randomly selected by the
principal investigator and reviewed with the RA.  Discrepancies between the principal 
investigator and the RA were corrected and re-training occurred as necessary.  After the 
first rater coded all tapes, the second rater was trained and re-coded all tapes. The second 
rater was blind to the coding of the first rater. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
 
Data Preparation 
Manipulation check and confederate effects.  No participants responded to the 
manipulation check by expressing disbelief that their conversation partner had been 
another study participant.  To assess for potential demand characteristics rela ed to 
differences among the four confederates, the means of 1) observer-rated performance 
(Performance) and 2) negative self-focused attention (NSFA) were compared across the 
four confederates.  Welch and Brown-Forsythe statistics were calculated due to the 
imbalance in sample sizes across the four confederates (n’s = 12, 13, 33, and 34).  No 
significant differences among confederates were detected for either of the test variables 
(Welch(Performance): F(3, 33.02) = .34, p > .05; Welch(NSFA): F(3, 32.64) = .69,  
p > .05; Brown-Forsythe(Performance): F(3, 57.41) = .38, p > .05; Brown-
Forsythe(NSFA): F(3, 51.83) = .73, p > .05).   
Social anxiety scores.  Cronbach’s Alphas were computed for the three measures 
of social anxiety.  Alphas were excellent for the Social Interaction Anxiety Scale (α = 
.94), the Social Phobia Scale (α = .93), and the Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale (α = 
.93).  Zero-order correlations among the three measures of social anxiety wer  high 
(SIAS/SPS: r = .81; SIAS/FNE: r = .73; SPS/FNE: r = .62).  The three social anxiety 
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measures were subsequently standardized and averaged to form the social anxiety 
composite variable used for all subsequent analyses.   
Means and standard deviations for the three measures of social anxiety used in the 
study are listed in Table 1.  Means and standard deviations are comparable to descriptive 
statistics reported elsewhere (c.f., Brown et al., 1997; Mattick & Clarke, 1998; Watson & 
Friend, 1969).  The standardized composite of the three social anxiety measures was 
analyzed to assess the distribution of social anxiety scores. Sixteen perct of the final 
sample scored at least one standard deviation above the mean on the social anxiety 
composite, with five participants scoring at least two standard deviations above the m an 
and an additional ten scoring at least one standard deviation above the mean.  Skew 
(1.04) and Kurtosis (.73) for the social anxiety composite were acceptable.   
Working memory scores.  Zero-order correlations and descriptive data for reading 
and spatial span tasks were examined.  Reading and spatial span were moderately 
correlated (r = .42, p < .001).  Means and standard deviations for RSPAN (M = 52.97, SD 
= 11.84) and SSPAN (M = 27.73, SD = 7.65) were comparable to those from a larger 
sample of 2908 participants previously collected (RSPAN: M = 46.77, SD = 15.20; 
SSPAN: M = 26.70, SD = 7.93; J. McVay, personal communication, March 15, 2010).  
Span scores were standardized and averaged to produce a working memory capacity 
composite score (WMC) that was normally distributed (skew = -0.51; kurtosis = -0.14).   
Negative self-focused attention scores.  Descriptive statistics and zero-order 
correlations for items on the Focus of Attention Scale (FAS) are presented in Tables 3 
and 4.  Consistent with expectations, general self-consciousness and the three negativ ly-
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worded items correlated moderately-to-highly with each other.  Similarly, the three 
positively-worded items correlated moderately-to-highly with each other.  In general, 
negatively-worded items were not significantly correlated with positively-worded items.  
However, awareness of negative thoughts correlated weakly but significantly with 
awareness of positive thoughts (r = -.21).  In addition, awareness of negative somatic 
sensations correlated weakly but significantly with awareness of positive somatic 
sensations (r = .26).  The positive correlation between these two items suggests that they 
may reflect a general somatic awareness in addition to assessing self-focus related 
specifically to social anxiety.   
To generate indices of general self-focus (both positive and negative), items on 
the FAS were subjected to a principal component analysis with Varimax rotation.  
Although the current sample size is small for a principle component analysis, the 
relatively small number of items on the FAS (7) allowed for 13 observations per variable.  
Bartlet’s Test of Sphericity (χ2(21) = 301.56, p < .001) and KMO (.73) were both 
acceptable.  Two components with eigenvalues greater than one accounting for 42.23 and 
29.06 percent of the variance respectively were extracted and rotated.  Items ass ssing 
general self-consciousness and awareness of negative thoughts, images, and somatic 
sensations correlated highly with Component 1 (ev = 2.97), whereas items assessing 
awareness of positive thoughts, images, and somatic sensations correlated highly with 
Component 2 (ev = 2.03; see Figure 2 for Rotated Component Plot).  The two items 
assessing awareness of somatic responses also loaded onto a third component.  However, 
because the eigenvalue was below one (ev = .72), this component was not extracted and 
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the somatic items were allowed to load onto the respective positive and negative self-
focus factors.   
Conversation performance scores.  Length and Flow domains for each rater were 
combined to form a performance composite for each rater.  Intraclass correlation for the 
performance composites was calculated as a measure of inter-rater reli bility.  The 
intraclass correlation was acceptable (.63), but lower than expected based on inter-rater 
reliability reported by Fydrich and colleagues (1998).  Consequently, ratings for the 
Length and Flow domains for each rater were examined to identify participants for which 
the raters disagreed by more than one rating point.  The principal investigator, serving as 
an expert rater, re-coded video-taped conversations for 15 participants for whom either 
the Flow or Length ratings were discrepant by two or more points.  The author’s rating 
replaced both research assistants’ ratings and intraclass correlation for he re-coded 
composites was calculated.  The intraclass correlation for the re-coded data (.82) was 
analogous to values reported by Fydrich and colleagues (1998).  Corrected performance 
composites for each rater were then averaged to form the overall performance composite 
for all analyses.  The overall performance composite was normally distributed (skew = -
.56, kurtosis = -.15).   
Descriptives and Zero-Order Correlations 
Means, standard deviations, ranges, skew, and kurtosis for all relevant measures 
are presented in Tables 1, 2, 3, and 5.  All measures demonstrated acceptable skew and 
kurtosis with the exception of the Social Phobia Scale, which was somewhat leptokurtic 
(kurtosis = 3.21).  However, the social anxiety composite score demonstrated acceptable 
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skew (1.04) and kurtosis (.73).  Because the Social Phobia Scale was not used for any 
analysis apart from its contribution to the social anxiety composite, no steps were tak n 
to correct for the elevated kurtosis.   
Individual Focus of Attention Scale (FAS) items assessing awareness of negative 
thoughts, awareness of negative observer-perspective images, and awareness of negative 
somatic responses all demonstrated positive skew, although skew for each of these
variables fell within the acceptable range (see Table 3).  In addition, visual inspect on of 
FAS data revealed that participants generally reported higher awareness of positive 
versus negative items (see Table 3).  A paired-samples t-test was therefore conducted to 
examine differences in the mean scores of each positive/negative FAS item.  Results 
indicated significantly higher means for awareness of: 1) positive versus negative 
thoughts (t (91) = -7.85, p < .001), 2) positive versus negative images (t (91) = -5.18, p < 
.001), and 3) pleasant versus unpleasant somatic responses (t (91) = -2.22, p < .05).  
These results, considered in conjunction with the correlations between social anxiety d 
the three FAS negative items, suggest that much of the variation in FAS negative item 
scores occurred in the upper portion of the social anxiety distribution.   
Zero-order correlations are presented in Tables 4 (self-focused attention items) 
and 6 (main study variables).  Most notable among the zero-order correlations, social 
anxiety and working memory were not significantly correlated (r = -.04), suggesting that 
attempts to reduce evaluative anxiety during the working memory assessment  were 
successful.  Because positive self-focus items were not included in main study analyses, 
correlations are not included in Table 6.  However, self-focus on positive thoughts 
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demonstrated a non-significant positive relationship with conversation performance (r = 
.18, p > .05), and self-focus on positive images demonstrated a significant positive 
relationship with performance (r = .24, p < .05). 
Hypotheses Tests 
Before testing moderation and mediation, a regression analysis was conducted to 
assess the direct effect of social anxiety on conversation performance (see Tabl  7).  In 
Step One of this analysis, the social anxiety composite was entered as a predictor with the 
working memory composite entered in Step Two.  In Step Three, the interaction term 
calculated by multiplying the social anxiety and working memory composites was 
entered.  In the full model, only social anxiety contributed significantly to the prediction 
of conversation performance (t (88) = -2.32, p < .05), suggesting a direct effect of social 
anxiety on observer-rated performance.  The significant negative relationship suggests 
that as levels of social anxiety increase, ratings of conversation performance decrease. 
After establishing a direct effect of social anxiety on conversation performance, a 
separate set of regression analyses was conducted for each of the negative s lf-focus 
components (i.e., preoccupation with negative thoughts, negative observer-perspective 
images, and unpleasant somatic sensations).  In addition, the analysis was repeated using 
the negative self-focus factor score as a measure of general self-focus.   
The first analysis tested the moderating effect of working memory capacity on the 
relationship between social anxiety and negative self-focused thoughts.  The raw score 
for negative self-focused thoughts was entered in a regression equation as the criterion
variable with social anxiety, working memory capacity, and the social anxiety/working 
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memory interaction term entered as predictors in separate steps (see Tabl  8).  Results 
indicated that the interaction term contributed significantly to the prediction of negative 
self-focused thoughts (t 88) = -2.00, p < .05), suggesting that working memory capacity 
moderated the relationship between social anxiety and self-focus on negative thoughts.  A 
follow-up simple slope analysis revealed that the strength of the association be ween 
social anxiety and self-focus on negative thoughts increases as levels of working memory 
decrease.  Figure 3 provides a graphical representation of this moderation effect.  
The next analysis examined self-focus on negative thoughts as a mediator in the 
relationship between social anxiety and conversation performance.  Conversation 
performance was entered as the dependent variable in a regression equation with scial 
anxiety, working memory capacity, the social anxiety/working memory interaction term, 
and self-focus on negative thoughts entered as independent variables in separate steps 
(see Table 9).  The addition of self-focus on negative thoughts to the model reduced the 
effect of social anxiety on conversation performance to non-significance (t (87) = -.01, p 
> .05) leaving self-focus on negative thoughts as the sole significant predictor in the full 
model (t (87) = -2.19, p < .05) and suggesting a full mediation of the social 
anxiety/conversation performance relationship.  A follow-up analysis of the indirect 
effect using bootstrapping methods outlined by Preacher and Hayes (2004) also detected 
a significant indirect effect (p < .05), providing additional evidence for mediation. 
Regression analyses testing moderation and mediation were repeated with the 
remaining individual negative self-focus items (i.e., preoccupation with negative 
observer-perspective images, preoccupation with unpleasant somatic respons ) and with 
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the rotated factor score for general negative self-focus.  Results of these analyses are 
summarized in Tables 10-15.  Individual regression analyses testing moderation failed to 
reach significance for models examining self-focus on negative observer-perspective 
images, self-focus on unpleasant somatic responses, and general negative slf-focus (see 
Tables 10, 12, and 14) suggesting that in the current sample the moderating effect of 
working memory was specific to the relationship between social anxiety and self-focus 
on negative thoughts.  However, self-focus on negative images and general self-focus 
both mediated the relationship between social anxiety and conversation performance (see 
Tables 11 and 15).  Only the regression analysis examining negative self-focused somatic 
awareness as a mediator of the social anxiety/conversation performance rel tionship 
failed to detect a significant indirect effect (see Table 13).  
Theory and research suggest differential effects on performance for positive 
versus negative self-focused attention (see Panayiotou & Vrana, 2004 for review).  To 
verify the specificity of effects detected in main study analyses, four additional regression 
analyses were conducted.  In these analyses, the effect of positive self focus items on 
conversation was examined while controlling for the effects of social anxiety (see Tables 
16-19).  The four positive self-focus items were: 1) awareness of positive thoughts, 2) 
awareness of positive observer-perspective images, 3) awareness of pleasant somatic 
responses, and 4) general positive self-focus.  Results of these analyses varied across 
predictors.  In three of the four analyses, the positive self-focus items (i.e., awareness of 
positive thoughts, awareness of positive images, and general positive self-focus) 
demonstrated a positive relationship with conversation performance, although, only 
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heightened awareness of positive images significantly predicted conversation 
performance (t (89) = 2.00, p < .05; see Table 17).  In contrast, awareness of positive 
somatic responses demonstrated a non-significant negative relationship with conversation 
performance (t (89) = -.53, p > .05; see Table 18).   
Depressive Symptoms.  Consistent with previous research (e.g., Carter & Wu, 
2010; Trew & Alden, 2009), the social anxiety composite correlated highly with 
depressive symptoms (r = .57, p < .001) in the current sample.  Original plans to exclude 
participants with high levels of depressive symptoms from final data analyses were 
deemed to be unfeasible due to the substantial overlap of social anxiety and depressive 
symptoms at the high end of the social anxiety distribution.  Specifically, 4 of 5 
participants scoring 2 standard deviations above the mean and an additional 4 of 10 
scoring 1 standard deviation above the mean on the social anxiety composite scored 
greater than 12 on the BDI.  Consequently, participants were not excluded from data 
analysis based on high BDI scores.  Instead, supplemental analyses were conducted in 
which BDI scores were included as a covariate in regression analyses testing social 
anxiety’s prediction of negative self-focused attention and conversation performance.  
BDI scores were not included as covariates in tests of the main study hypotheses du  to 
the above noted high correlations of social anxiety and depressive symptoms (r = .57), 
and the notable overlap of these constructs at high levels of social anxiety.  Th  
supplemental analyses were conducted to explore the relative contributions of social 
anxiety and depressive symptoms given the above-noted limitations. 
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The first supplemental analysis controlled for depressive symptoms while testing 
the prediction of self-focus on negative thoughts by social anxiety (see Table 20).  BDI 
scores were entered in Step 1 of a regression equation predicting self-focus on negative 
thoughts.  Social anxiety was then entered in Step 2.  In the full model, only social 
anxiety (t (89) = 7.93, p < .05) contributed significantly to the prediction of negative self 
focused attention.  This analysis was repeated in three separate regression equations with 
self focus on negative observer perspective images, self-focus on unpleasant somatic 
responses, and the negative self focus factor score serving as the respectiv  dependent 
variables (see Tables 21-23).  In the final model of each analysis, social anxiety, but not 
depressive symptoms, significantly predicted negative self-focus.   
The next set of regression analyses again controlled for depressive symptoms 
while testing the direct effect of social anxiety on conversation performance (see Table 
24).  With conversation performance serving as the dependent variable, BDI scores were 
entered in Step 1 and scores for the social anxiety composite were entered in Step 2. In 
the full model, depressive symptoms failed to account for significant variance (t (89) = -
.35, p = .73), whereas social anxiety ( (89) = -1.71, p = .09) demonstrated a non-
significant trend.  This finding suggests that some of the relationship between social 
anxiety and conversation performance may be accounted for by variance shared with 
depressive symptoms.
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The current study tested a moderated mediation model in which: 1) negative self-
focused attention was proposed to mediate the relationship between social anxiety and 
conversation performance, and 2) working memory capacity was proposed to moderate 
the relationship between social anxiety and negative self-focused attention.  I  addition, 
three key targets of self-focused attention (i.e., negative thoughts, negative observer-
perspective images, and unpleasant somatic responses) were considered separately as 
well as in combination.  This strategy allowed for the exploration of potential differences 
related to negative self-focus on different types of cognitive and physiologica  
experiences.   
The direct effect of social anxiety on conversation performance was supported. 
Results for tests of mediation indicated that self-focus on negative thoughts, self-focus on 
negative observer-perspective images, and general negative self-focus all medi ted the 
relationship between social anxiety and performance.  Only self-focus on unpleasant 
somatic responses failed to mediate.  Tests of moderation indicated that working memory 
capacity moderated the relationship between social anxiety and self-focus on negative 
thoughts.  However, significant moderation effects by working memory capacity were 
not detected for the relationships between social anxiety and self-focus on negative 
observer-perspective images, self-focus on unpleasant somatic responses, or general 
 
 36 
  
negative self-focus.  Supplemental analyses indicated that: 1) the mediating effect is 
specific to self-focus on negative, but not positive, cognitive experiences and 2) 
symptoms of depression may contribute to the relationship between social anxiety d 
performance. 
Self-Focused Attention as a Mediator 
 Using the conceptualization of self-focused attention suggested by Clark and 
Wells (1995), the current investigation considered three possible targets of self-f cused 
attention: 1) thoughts, 2) observer-perspective images, and 3) somatic responses.  In 
addition, effects related to a general negative self-focus factor score were also examined.  
The hypothesized mediation of the social anxiety/conversation performance relationship 
by self-focused attention received mixed support across the separate targets of self-focus 
and the negative self-focus factor score. 
Social anxiety demonstrated a significant negative relationship with objectively-
rated performance during a four-minute opposite-sex social interaction.  This finding s 
consistent with previous studies linking social anxiety to performance deficits (e.g., 
Alden & Wallace, 1995; Rapee & Lim, 1992; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Voncken & Bogels, 
2008).  However, negative self-focused attention mediated the effect of social anxiety on 
performance in the current study.  This finding suggests that the more aware a person is 
of negative thoughts and observer-perspective images, the more performance duri g a 
conversation may suffer.   
Of the three targets of self-focus examined in the current study, only heightened 
awareness of negative somatic responses failed to mediate the relationship between social 
 
 37 
  
anxiety and performance.  On the surface, this finding may seem directly contrary to the 
suggestions of Clark and Wells (1995) that somatic responses are a primary target of self-
focused attention for persons with high levels of social anxiety.  In fact, among the three 
targets of self-focused attention assessed in the current study, awareness of unpleasant 
somatic responses demonstrated the weakest correlation with social anxiety.   
Why did the results of the current study fail to support the role of self-focus for 
unpleasant somatic responses as a mediator of the social anxiety/performance 
relationship?  Theoretically, awareness of unpleasant somatic responses may not be as 
essential to the experience of social anxiety as are the negative thoughts and images that 
follow somatic responses.  Clark and Wells (1995) suggest that people with high levels of 
social anxiety use their awareness of somatic responses (e.g., blushing, shaking, 
sweating) to construct exaggerated negative images of how others perceive them (i.e., 
they imagine themselves as sweating profusely).  In turn, somatic responses and negative 
images contribute to increases in negative cognitions about how one is performing (i.e., 
“everyone can see me sweating,” “I’m going to humiliate myself”).  Whereas anyone 
might be aware of their own negative somatic responses, persons with high levels of 
social anxiety use information gathered from somatic responses as fuel for the negative 
thoughts and observer-perspective images that ultimately interfere with their 
performance.  A similar pattern has been noted in panic disorder, wherein focus has been 
shown to shift from physiological responses to awareness of behaviors during a cognitive 
stressor (Borden et al., 1993).  Consequently, results of the current study suggestthat 
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images and thoughts resulting from somatic responses impact performance more so than 
the somatic responses alone. 
A second explanation for the failure to detect a mediating effect of self-focus on 
somatic responding is methodological.  Results of the current study revealed a small but 
significant positive relationship between awareness of pleasant and unpleasant somatic 
sensations.  Although heightened awareness of negative somatic sensations is likely an 
important component of the social anxiety experience, the relationships among social 
anxiety, negative somatic awareness, and performance deficits may have been weakened 
by items on the Focus of Attention Scale (FAS) that captured a general som tic 
awareness, regardless of the valence of somatic experiences.  Future examinations of self-
focus on somatic responses may need to assess more specifically somaticresponses 
linked with social anxiety (e.g., blushing, sweating, trembling hands). 
Although the intent of the current study was to explore the effects of negative 
self-focused attention on performance, supplemental analyses examining positive self-
focus were conducted to verify that detrimental effects on performance are specific to 
negative self-focus.  Past studies have demonstrated that self-focus may only interfere 
with performance when individual and situational characteristics (e.g., low social self-
efficacy and high fear of evaluation during social interactions) are present (.g., Burgio et 
al., 1986).  Results indicated that positive self-focus did not negatively impact 
performance during the opposite-sex conversation task.  In fact, heightened awareness of 
positive observer-perspective images significantly predicted higher performance ratings 
after controlling for levels of social anxiety.  In other words, given equivalent levels of 
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social anxiety, self-focus on positive observer-perspective images predicted better 
performance during an opposite-sex conversation task.  Such a finding suggests that 
performance is not impaired simply as a result of self-focus.  Instead, effects on 
performance appear to be specific to the valence of the experiences that capture attention. 
What specific mechanism might contribute to performance deficits when persons 
experience negative, but not positive, self-focused attention?  The findings presented 
here, as well as in previous studies, do not support an explanation of performance 
impairment based solely on increased cognitive load.  In fact, Pontari and Schlenker 
(2000) found that increasing cognitive load can sometimes improve performance on 
social interaction tasks.  They had introverts participate in a social interaction task and 
asked them to adopt an extraverted self-presentational style.  They found that asking he 
introverts to keep an 8-digit number in mind during the interaction task decreased 
negative self-awareness and actually improved their ability to effectively adopt an 
extraverted self-presentation.  Such findings support the assertions of Clark and Wells 
(1995) that performance impairment is directly related to the negative valence of 
cognitive and physiological experiences upon which persons with high levels of social 
anxiety focus (i.e., negative self-focused attention).   
One explanation for the specific effects of negative self-focus is that negative self-
focus may initiate other cognitive processes that interfere with performance.  In the 
current study, participants were asked to report their awareness of negative thoughts 
about themselves (“In the past four minutes, how much were you aware of negative 
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thoughts about yourself?”).   Although this method assessed for self-focus, it did not 
probe for other cognitive processes that may be associated with negative self-focus.   
A possible process that could be associated with negative self-focus is worry. 
Worry is characterized by predominately negatively-valenced verbal thought focused on 
preparing for potentially negative future consequences of common situations.  Notably, 
worry is typically not focused on the self, but rather on potential negative consequences 
related to a given situation.  As such, the measure of self-focus used in the current study 
would not necessarily assess for worry.  Studies have demonstrated evidence for a 
relationship between social anxiety and worry during social situations (Morris, Harris, & 
Rovins, 1981).  In addition, researchers examining test anxiety have long implicated 
worry as a mechanism associated with performance deficits (e.g., Keogh, B nd, French, 
Richards, & Davis, 2004).  Although the relationship between negative self-focus and 
performance is likely multidetermined, worry may represent a key mechanism through 
which negative self-focus affects performance. 
Working Memory Capacity as a Moderator 
 The previous section details support for the role of negative self-focused attention 
as a mediator in the relationship between social anxiety and performance deficits.  
However, executive attention theory suggests that differences in working memory 
capacity reflect, among other things, differences in the control of attention (e.g., Kane, 
Conway et al., 2007).  A key hypothesis of the current study, therefore, was that 
differences in working memory capacity could impact the strength of the relationship 
between social anxiety and negative self-focused attention.   
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 As with tests of mediation, tests of moderation in the current study provided 
mixed results.  Working memory capacity significantly moderated the relationship 
between social anxiety and negative self-focused thoughts.  Follow-up analyses of this 
significant moderation effect suggest that as levels of working memory capacity increase, 
the strength of the relationship between social anxiety and awareness of negative 
thoughts decreases.  In other words, although preoccupation with negative thoughts is 
substantially linked with social anxiety, persons with higher levels of working memory 
capacity may be less susceptible to heightened awareness of negative thoughts, across all 
levels of social anxiety.  Given the links among social anxiety, self-focus on negative 
thoughts, and performance deficits, higher working memory capacity could represent a 
substantial advantage for persons with high levels of trait social anxiety. 
 The results related to working memory’s influence on the link between social 
anxiety and preoccupation with negative thoughts is promising.  However, results for the 
moderating effect of working memory capacity across other targets of negative self-focus 
were not consistent with hypotheses.  Working memory did not significantly moderate 
the relationships between social anxiety and self-focus on negative observer-p rspective 
images or somatic responses.  Nor did it moderate the relationship between social anxiety 
and negative self-focus composite.   
The executive attention factor associated with measures of working memory 
capacity is proposed to be domain-general (e.g., Kane, Conway et al., 2007).  Although 
no a priori hypotheses were made regarding differences among the three targets of self-
focus, the failure to detect significant moderation across different targets of self-focus 
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was not entirely expected.  However, as noted previously, researchers suggest that 
cognitive processing may be different for thoughts versus imagery versus somatic 
responses (e.g., Borkovec, Alcaine, and Behar, 2004; Hamilton, 1986; Hirsch, Clark, & 
Matthews, 2006; Ingram, 1990).   The current findings suggest that these experi nces 
(i.e., thoughts, observer-perspective images, and somatic responses) may each respond in 
unique ways to the process of executive attention.  Kane, Conway, and colleagues (2007) 
suggest that working memory capacity reflects the ability to maintain task-relevant 
information in an active state thereby inhibiting capture by task-irrelevant information.  If 
so, then perhaps the ability to inhibit attention capture by irrelevant information is 
specific to verbal-linguistic cognitions, particularly during a social interaction task like 
the one used in the current study.  Future studies examining self-focused attention in 
social anxiety would benefit from a more explicit investigation of the diffrential effects 
of working memory capacity on verbal thoughts versus imagery versus somatic 
responses. 
Summary: Negative Self-Focused Thoughts and Moderated Mediation 
 Results revealed a differential pattern of moderation for self-focus on negative 
thoughts, images, and somatic responses.  Although these variables were moderately-to-
highly correlated, they appear to each represent distinct cognitive content a d may affect 
other aspects of information processing in unique ways (e.g., Hamilton, 1986; Hirsch, 
Clark, and Matthews, 2006).  Among the three targets of self-focused attention examin d 
in the current investigation, results for self-focus on negative thoughts were most 
consistent with the hypothesized moderated mediation model.  Conversely, results failed 
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to support either aspect of the hypothesized model for self-focus on unpleasant somatic
responses.  Subsequent sections of the current paper present implications for these
findings and suggestions for future studies to further clarify the relationships among 
social anxiety, self-focused attention, performance deficits, and working memory 
capacity.  
Findings Regarding Symptoms of Depression 
 The current study did not make a priori predictions regarding any contributions of 
depressive symptoms to the hypothesized model.  However, a previous research provides 
evidence for a relationship between depression and negative self-focused attention (e.g., 
Edison & Adams, 1992).  Consequently, a measure of depressive symptoms (i.e., BDI) 
was included in the study for supplemental analyses.   
 Results supported a direct effect of depressive symptoms on all four measures of 
negative self-focus.  However, in all models tested, depression failed to predict negative 
self-focus after accounting for the effects of social anxiety.  Conversely, social anxiety 
predicted negative self-focus after accounting for the effects of depression in all analyses.  
Similarly, depression failed to predict conversation performance deficits, although 
inclusion of depressive symptoms in a model predicting conversation performance 
reduced the effect of social anxiety to non-significant.  These findings suggest that social 
anxiety, rather than depression, accounts for both negative self-focused attention and 
performance deficits during a situation with high potential for social evaluation, although 
some shared variance between social anxiety and depression may be important in 
predicting how one’s performance during a conversation is perceived by an objective 
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observer.  However, given the substantial overlap of depression and social anxiety in this 
and other samples (e.g., Carter & Wu, 2010; Trew & Alden, 2009), persons with high 
levels of “pure” social anxiety unaffected by symptoms of depression are likely a rare 
breed.  
Limitations 
 The current investigation integrated constructs and methodologies from the fields 
of clinical, cognitive, and social psychology to examine the link between social anxiety 
and performance during an opposite-sex social interaction.  Although this integration 
produced some promising results, it also provided some methodological challenges.  
Reliable sampling of moment-to-moment cognitive experiences during an ongoing social 
interaction is difficult.  Previous studies examining the relationship between working 
memory capacity and mind wandering have utilized in-the-moment thought sampling 
strategies (e.g., McVay & Kane, 2009).  However, maintaining the ecological validity of 
the conversation task used in the current study required a retrospective report of cognitive 
experiences after the conclusion of the social interaction.  This measurement strategy 
somewhat limits the interpretability of mediation analyses because a temporal link from 
negative self-focus to performance can not be verified.  Retrospective reporting of 
cognitive experiences, even occurring only minutes after a task, may be susceptible to 
memory biases and other sources of inaccurate reporting.  However, use of such 
retrospective assessment techniques may be one of the best methods currently available 
for ecologically valid assessment of self-focus during a social interaction. 
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Clinical Implications 
Whereas typical cognitive-behavioral treatments emphasize the importance of 
disputing dysfunctional thoughts, they do not address attention control skills.  Current 
findings support a substantial role of negative self-focused attention in the relationship 
between social anxiety and performance deficits.  As such, people with high levels of 
social anxiety will likely benefit from treatment techniques aimed at redirecting the focus 
of attention away from negative thoughts and images.  Consequently, clinicians may 
consider including attention control training in CBT treatments for social anxiety.  For 
example, mindfulness techniques may help clients learn to redirect attention away from 
negative thought content and focus instead on present-moment experiences.  For persons 
with high levels of social anxiety, maintaining focus on an ongoing conversation could 
reduce observable performance deficits.  Results of the current study also suggest a 
specific role of working memory capacity in weakening the relationship between social 
anxiety and self-focus on negative thoughts.  Recent work examining automated working 
memory training programs has produced promising results (e.g., Jaeggi, Buschkuehl, 
Jonides, & Perrig, 2008; McNab et al., 2009).  Clinicians could include such training 
programs in treatment packages for social anxiety. 
Research Implications 
One key research implication of the current study relates to the potential impact of 
social anxiety on the assessment of working memory capacity.  Previous studies have 
found evidence supporting a negative relationship between social anxiety and working 
memory capacity during social-evaluative threat conditions (Wenzel & Holt, 2003), but 
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researchers should use caution when assessing and interpreting any relationship between 
social anxiety and working memory capacity.  One explanation for a relationship between 
social anxiety and working memory capacity may be inherent in the main findings of the 
current study.  Negative self-focused attention (particularly heightened awareness of 
negative thoughts and observer-perspective images) mediated the relationship between 
social anxiety and conversation performance.  As such, increases in state anxie y could 
negatively impact performance on working memory assessments for persons with high 
levels of social anxiety.   
Several precautions were taken to decrease the impact of negative self-focused 
attention on working memory assessment in the current study.  First, participants were 
not informed of the social interaction task until after they completed the span tasks.  In 
addition, participants worked alone in a room completing automated reading and spatial 
span tasks.  Investigators examining the relationship between social anxiety and working 
memory capacity should consider including similar precautions to increase the chances of 
obtaining accurate assessments of “true” working memory capacity. 
Future Directions 
A strength of the current investigation was an assessment of self-focus that: 1) 
mapped on to the theoretically-defined experience of self-focused attention outl ned by 
Clark and Wells (1995), and 2) allowed for the analysis of differential effects rlated to 
specific positive and negative foci of attention (i.e., thoughts, images, and somatic 
responses).  Results supported a moderating effect of working memory capacity in the 
relationship between social anxiety and self-focus on negative thoughts.  However, this 
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effect was not replicated when the dependent variable was either self-focus on negative 
observer perspective images, self-focus on unpleasant somatic responses, or general 
negative self-focus.  Future investigations could benefit from in-depth investigations of 
the targets of self- and external focused attention and the differential effects o  those 
targets on outcome variables of interest.  One start for such research could be further 
development of methods for assessing self-focused attention.  For example, the Focus of 
Attention Scale (FAS) used in the current study could be refined to include multiple items 
for each target of self focus (i.e., multiple items assessing respectively thoughts, images, 
and somatic responses).  In addition, the FAS could benefit from the inclusion of items 
assessing external focus of attention and specific cognitive processes ( .g., worry) to 
provide additional insight into the mechanisms underlying the relationship between 
negative self-focus and performance deficits. 
 Social anxiety has been linked with biased attention toward potentially 
threatening external stimuli (e.g., Amir, Freshman, & Foa, 2002; Hope, Rapee, 
Heimberg, & Dombeck, 1990).  The current model could be tested using external stimuli 
in place of self-focused attention.  Stroop and dot probe designs could allow for an 
exploration of the moderating role of working memory capacity when biased attention is 
directed outward instead of inward.  Eventually, comprehensive models could be 
developed accounting for the specific contributions of self- and external focused attention 
to the maintenance of social anxiety. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
 Clark and Wells (1995) theorize that persons with high levels of social anxiety 
experience negative self-focused attention (i.e., heightened awareness of negative 
thoughts, observer-perspective images, and somatic responses) during social enc unters.  
Further, they suggest that negative self-focused attention negatively impacts performance 
of appropriate social skills.  Results of the current study are consistent wih the growing 
body of research supporting the links between social anxiety, negative self-focused 
attention, and performance deficits during interpersonal encounters.  Results also add a 
potentially important new finding to previous social anxiety research.  Specifically, 
individual differences in working memory capacity demonstrated a moderating effect in 
the relationship between social anxiety and self-focus on negative thoughts.  As such, 
working memory capacity may represent an important construct for consideration in 
future information processing models of social anxiety
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APPENDIX A: CODING FOR SOCIAL PERFORMANCE RATING SCALE 
 
LENGTH 
1) Very Poor: Monosyllabic (‘hmmm,’’yeah,’’OK’) speech turns; or responses so long 
that partner must interrupt or cannot utter reply. 
2) Poor: Participant makes mostly short statements with very long pauses; or peaks in 
long phrases that monopolize the conversation 
3) Fair: Participant mostly speaks one sentence at a time with occasional long pauses 
between sentences; or s/he tends to talk excessively (or tangentially) most of the time but 
allows some responses from the partner 
4) Good: Participant mostly speaks in statements of one or two sentences without any 
major pauses, but there are other occasions where speech is short or excessive or 
tangential 
5) Very Good: At most times, participant’s utterances are two or more sentencs lo g.  
Participant acknowledges partner’s remarks without taking over and monopolizing the 
conversation. 
 
CONVERSATION FLOW 
1) Very Poor: Participant makes few attempts to initiate the conversation.  Eve when 
prompted by the partner, participant cannot maintain the conversation.  Participant uses 
almost no open-ended questions, or is intrusive in questions and shows no empathy.  
Participant does not attend to information provided by partner 
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2) Poor: Participant tries to initiate the conversation but is only successful about half the 
time.  The conversation does not flow smoothly, but is more like an interview than a 
conversation (participant does not follow up on topics and does not provide free 
information about him/herself). Participant sometimes forgets factual information 
provided by the partner (repeats questions) 
3) Fair: For the most part, the participant is able to maintain the conversation with little 
help from the partner, although the conversation is still somewhat awkward and stalls at 
times.  Participant asks some open-ended questions.  Participant provides little free 
information and may forget the partner’s comments. 
4) Good: Participant is able to maintain the conversation with little to no help from the 
partner.  The conversation flows smoothly (given partner’s responses), the participant 
discloses something about the self, and then asks partner a related question (e.g., open-
ended questions).  Shows interest in partner, and follows up appropriately on partner’s 
remarks.  No obvious deficits. 
5) Very Good: Participant easily maintains the conversation and responds smoothly to 
pauses in the conversations, often by following up on previous information provided by 
the partner or providing free information about the self on a related topic.  Participant 
introduces new topics fluidly and frequently uses open-ended questions.  Participant 
shows genuine interest in the partner and follows up on the partner’s remarks with 
warmth or enthusiasm. 
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APPENDIX B: FOCUS OF ATTENTION SCALE 
 
For each question below, please circle the number on the scale that best represents 
your response.  You may circle a number either above or below the line on the scale, 
but you may only circle ONE number.  
 
 
1) In the past four minutes, how self-conscious were you? 
 
   Not at All                          Extremely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
     /         /      /      /      /      /      /      /      /      / 
    5    15    25    35    45    55    65    75    85    95 
 
 
2) In the past four minutes, how much were you aware of negative thoughts about 
yourself? 
 
   Not at All                          Extremely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
     /         /      /      /      /      /      /      /      /      / 
    5    15    25    35    45    55    65    75    85    95 
 
3) In the past four minutes, how much were you aware of positive thoughts about 
yourself? 
 
   Not at All                          Extremely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
     /         /      /      /      /      /      /      /      /      / 
    5    15    25    35    45    55    65    75    85    95 
 
4)  In the past four minutes, how much were you aware of negative images of how you 
appeared to others? 
 
   Not at All                          Extremely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
     /         /      /      /      /      /      /      /      /      / 
    5    15    25    35    45    55    65    75    85    95 
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5)  In the past four minutes, how much were you aware of positive images of how you 
appeared to others? 
 
   Not at All                          Extremely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
     /         /      /      /      /      /      /      /      /      / 
    5    15    25    35    45    55    65    75    85    95 
 
6)  In the past four minutes, how much were you aware of unpleasant bodily sensations? 
 
   Not at All                          Extremely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
     /         /      /      /      /      /      /      /      /      / 
    5    15    25    35    45    55    65    75    85    95 
 
7)  In the past four minutes, how much were you aware of pleasant bodily sensations? 
 
   Not at All                          Extremely 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
/ / / / / / / / / / / 
     /         /      /      /      /      /      /      /      /      / 
    5    15    25    35    45    55    65    75    85    95 
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APPENDIX C: TABLES 
 
 
Table 1 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Social Anxiety Measures 
             
           Range 
Measure   Mean   S.D.           Min      Max         Skew    Kurtosis 
SPS    17.29  13.91            0.00     72.00        1.68           3.21   
SIAS    24.01  14.87            0.00     69.00          .90      .39 
FNE    13.70    8.21            0.00     30.00          .35          -1.07 
SATOT     0.00     .90              -1.51       2.86         1.04      .73 
SPS = Social Phobia Scale; SIAS = Social Interaction Anxiety Scale; FNE = Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; SATOT = Average of Standardized Scores for SPS, SIAS, and FNE 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Capacity Measures 
             
           Range 
Measure   Mean   S.D.           Min      Max         Skew    Kurtosis 
RSPAN    52.97  11.84          23.00     75.00 -.51   -.38 
SSPAN             27.73    7.65            6.00     41.00 -.27   -.34 
RSPERR     5.40    3.51            0.00     17.00  .93    .70 
SSPERR     3.12    6.25            0.00     13.00 1.55   2.93 
WMC      0.00     .84          -2.19       1.46  -.51   -.14  
RSPAN = Reading Span; SPAN = Spatial Span; RSPERR = eading Span Error; SSPERR =  
Spatial Span Error; WMC = Average of Standardized Scores for RSPAN and SSPAN  
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Self-Focused Attention Measures 
            
           Range 
Measure         Mean    S.D.            Min     Max           Skew    Kurtosis 
Self Cons.          34.84  27.22            0.00    100.00  .42    -.76 
Neg. Thoughts   17.45             24.53            0.00    100.00 1.55    1.60 
Pos. Thoughts    52.07  29.78            0.00    100.00 -.18    -.84 
Neg. Images    24.02             29.06            0.00    100.00   .91    -.56 
Pos. Images    47.55  29.26            0.00    100.00   .04    -.95 
Neg. Somatic     18.86             25.68            0.00      90.00 1.32     .43 
Pos. Somatic    26.36  27.58            0.00    100.00   .91    -.11 
Gen. Neg. S.F.     0.00    1.00           -1.16        2.59   .97    -.10  
Note. Self Cons. = General Self-Consciousness; Neg. Thoug ts = Awareness of negative thoughts; Pos. 
Thoughts = Awareness of positive thoughts; Neg. Images = Awareness of negative images of the self; Pos. 
Images = Awareness of positive images of the self; Neg. Somatic = Awareness of unpleasant body 
sensations; Pos. Somatic = Awareness of pleasant body sensations; Gen. Neg. S.F. = Negative self-focus 
attention factor score from principle component analysis for Focus of Attention Scale 
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Table 4 
 
Zero-Order Correlations Between Focus of Attention Scale Items 
Measures    1     2           3            4    5              6             7   
1.  Self Cons.  ___        .68**        -.14        .67**      -.09          .51**        -.06 
2.  Neg. Thoughts    ___           -.21*      .86**      -.12          .49**         .03  
3.  Pos. Thoughts          ___           -.16            .68**    -.07           .46** 
4.  Neg. Images             ___         -.12          .48**         .06      
5.  Pos. Images                  ___     -.06           .42**      
6.  Neg. Somatic                      ___           .26*  
7.  Pos. Somatic                             ___  
__________________________________________________________________     
Note. Self Cons. = General Self-Consciousness; Neg. Thoug ts = Awareness of negative thoughts; Pos. 
Thoughts = Awareness of positive thoughts; Neg. Images = Awareness of negative images of the self; Pos. 
Images = Awareness of positive images of the self; Neg. Somatic = Awareness of unpleasant body 
sensations; Pos. Somatic = Awareness of pleasant body sensations; Gen. Neg. S.F. = Negative self-focus 
attention factor score from principle component analysis for Focus of Attention Scale 
*p < .05; **p < .01. 
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Table 5 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Corrected Observer Ratings of Role-Plays (Social Performance 
Rating Scale) 
             
           Range 
Measure   Mean   S.D.           Min      Max         Skew      Kurtosis 
FLOW1   3.38  1.11  1.00     5.00           -.36   -.42 
FLOW2   3.43  1.07  1.00     5.00           -.57   -.12 
LGTH1   3.54  0.91  1.00     5.00           -.22   -.30 
LGTH2   3.54  0.83  2.00     5.00           -.02   -.51 
PER1    3.46  0.88  1.50     5.00  -.44   -.34 
PER2    3.49  0.87  1.50     5.00  -.53   -.02 
PERFORM   3.48  0.83  1.50     5.00  -.56  -.15 
 
Note. Flow 1 = SPRS Flow Domain for Rater One after correction by expert rater; Flow 2 = SPRS Fow 
Domain for Rater Two after correction; LGTH1 = SPRS Length Domain for Rater One after correction; 
LGTH2 = SPRS Length Domain for Rater Two after correction; PER1 = Average of SPRS Flow and 
Length Domains for Rater One after correction; PER2 = Average of SPRS Flow and Length Domains for 
Rater Two after correction; PERFORM = Average of Performance composites across raters 
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Table 6 
Zero-Order Correlations Between Main Study Variables 
Measures     1    2    3   4    5    6    7    8  
1.  Social Anxiety  ___ -.04  .71** .64** .53** .74** -.20** -.24*      
2.  Working Memory   ___  .00 .08 .04  .08     -.01  .02         
3.  Neg. Thoughts    ___  .86** .49** .90**  -.15      -.33**     
4.  Neg. Images     ___ .48** .90      -.12 -.32**     
5.  Neg. Somatic Response     ___ .72 .08 -.15    
6.  General Neg. Self-Focus      ___     -.01 -.34**    
7.  General Pos. Self-Focus       ___  .17         
8.  Performance         ___          
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Social Anxiety = Social Anxiety Composite; Working Memory = Working memory composite; Neg. 
Thoughts = Focus of Attention Scale (FAS) item asses ing awareness of negative thoughts; Neg. Images = 
FAS item assessing awareness of negative observer-perspective images; Neg. Somatic Response = FAS 
item assessing awareness of unpleasant somatic responses; General Neg. Self-Focus = Rotated factor score 
for negative self-focus items from FAS; General Pos. Self-Focus = Rotated factor score for positive self-
focus items from FAS; Performance = Composite of Flw and Length domains from Social Performance 
Rating Scale (SPRS) averaged across raters after corr cti n by expert rater 
*p < .05; **p < .01.
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Table 7 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Conversation Performance by Social Anxiety  
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety     -.22   .10  -.24*        
Step 2            .06  .00 
   Working Memory Capacity     .01   .10   .01     
Step 3            .06  .00 
   SAxWMC       .02   .13   .02      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Working Memory Capacity = Composite of Spatial Span and Reading Span; SAxWMC = Interaction of Social Anxiety 
and Working Memory Composites 
*p < .05. 
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Table 8 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Moderation of Relationship between Social Anxiety and Negative Self-Focused 
Thoughts by Working Memory Capacity 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .50*   
   Social Anxiety                 19.57  2.00   .72**        
Step 2            .50  .00 
   Working Memory Capacity     .38  2.15   .01     
Step 3            .52  .02* 
   SAxWMC     -5.37  2.68  -.15*      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Working Memory Capacity = Composite of Spatial Span and Reading Span; SAxWMC = Interaction of Social Anxiety 
and Working Memory Composites 
*p < .05, **p < .001. 
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Table 9 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Mediation of Relationship between Social Anxiety and Conversation Performance by 
Negative Self-Focused Thoughts 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety                -.01   .14  -.01        
Step 2            .06  .00 
   Working Memory Capacity     .01   .10   .01 
Step 2            .06  .00 
   SAxWMC      -.04   .13  -.03     
Step 3            .11  .05* 
  Negative Self-Focused Thoughts   -.27   .12  -.32*      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction A xiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale; Working Memory 
Capacity = Composite of Spatial Span and Reading Span; SAxWMC = Interaction of Social Anxiety and Working Memory Composites; Negative Self-
Focused Attention = Item from Focus of Attention Scale Assessing Awareness of Negative Thoughts  
*p < .05. 
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Table 10 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Moderation of Relationship between Social Anxiety and Negative Self-Focused 
Images by Working Memory Capacity 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .41**   
   Social Anxiety               20.85  2.62   .65**        
Step 2            .42  .01 
   Working Memory Capacity               3.22  2.81   .09     
Step 3            .42  .00 
   SAxWMC     -2.64  3.50  -.06      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Working Memory Capacity = Composite of Spatial Span and Reading Span; SAxWMC = Interaction of Social Anxiety 
and Working Memory Composites 
*p < .05, **p < .001. 
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Table 11 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Mediation of Relationship between Social Anxiety and Conversation Performance by 
Negative Self-Focused Images 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety     -.06   .12  -.07        
Step 2            .10  .04* 
   Negative Self-Focused Attention   -.23   .11  -.27*      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Negative Self-Focused Attention = Factor Score from Principle Component Analysis of Focus of Attention Negatively 
Worded Items 
*p < .05. 
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Table 12 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Moderation of Relationship between Social Anxiety a d Negative Body Sensations 
by Working Memory Capacity 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .28**   
   Social Anxiety                 15.28  2.57   .54**        
Step 2            .28  .00 
   Working Memory Capacity                  1.58  2.76   .05     
Step 3            .28  .00 
   SAxWMC       -1.47  3.43  -.04      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Working Memory Capacity = Composite of Spatial Span and Reading Span; SAxWMC = Interaction of Social Anxiety 
and Working Memory Composites 
*p < .05, **p < .001. 
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Table 13 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Mediation of Relationship between SocialAnxiety and Conversation Performance by 
Negative Somatic Responses 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety     -.21   .11  -.23        
Step 2            .06  .00 
   Negative Somatic Responses    .02   .10  -.03      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Negative Somatic Responses = Focus of Attention Scale (FAS) item assessing awareness of negative somatic responses 
*p < .05. 
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Table 14 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Moderation of Relationship between Social Anxiety and General Negative Self-
Focus Factor by Working Memory Capacity 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .54*   
   Social Anxiety      .82   .08   .75**        
Step 2            .55  .01 
   Working Memory Capacity     .11   .08   .09     
Step 3            .56  .01 
   SAxWMC      -.14   .11  -.10      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Working Memory Capacity = Composite of Spatial Span and Reading Span; SAxWMC = Product of social anxiety and 
working memory composite scores 
*p < .05, **p < .001. 
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Table 15 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Mediation of Relationship between SocialAnxiety and Conversation Performance by 
General Negative Self-Focus Factor 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety      .03   .14   .03        
Step 2            .11  .06* 
   General Negative Self-Focus   -.30   .12  -.36*      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; General Negative Self-Focus = Factor Score from Principle Component Analysis of Focus of Attention Negatively 
Worded Items 
*p < .05. 
 
 
79 
Table 16 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Conversation Performance by Awareness of Positive Self-Focused 
Thoughts and Social Anxiety 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety               -.19   .10  -.21        
Step 2            .07  .02 
   Positive Self-Focused Thoughts    .11   .09   .13      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Positive Self-Focused Thoughts = Awareness of positive thoughts item from Focus of Attention Scale 
*p < .05. 
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Table 17 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Conversation Performance by Awareness of Positive Self-Focused 
Images and Social Anxiety 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety     -.19   .10  -.20        
Step 2            .10  .04* 
   Positive Self-Focused Images    .17   .09   .21*      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Positive Self-Focused Images = Awareness of positive observer-p rspective images item from Focus of Attention Scale 
*p < .05. 
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Table 18 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Conversation Performance by Awareness of Pleasant Somatic 
Responses and Social Anxiety 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*    
   Social Anxiety     -.22   .10  -.24*        
Step 2            .06  .00 
   Positive Somatic Responses     -.05   .09  -.05      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Positive Somatic Responses = Awareness of pleasant body sensations item from Focus of Attention Scale 
*p < .05. 
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Table 19 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Conversation Performance by General Positive Self-Focus Factor and 
Social Anxiety 
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .06*   
   Social Anxiety     -.20   .10  -.22*        
Step 2            .07  .02 
   Positive Self-Focused Attention    .11   .09   .13      
Note. Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation 
Scale; Positive Self-Focused Attention = Factor Score from Principle Component Analysis of Focus of Attention Positively 
Worded Items 
*p < .05. 
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Table 20 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Self-Focus on Negative Thoughts by Social Anxiety and Depressive 
Symptoms 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .15**   
   BDI       -.62  2.24  -.03        
Step 2            .50  .35** 
   Social Anxiety              19.67  2.48   .72**      
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia 
Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
** p < .001. 
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Table 21 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Self-Focus on Negative Observer-Perspective Images by Depressive 
Symptoms and Social Anxiety 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .12*   
   BDI       -.91  2.88  -.03        
Step 2            .41  .30** 
   Social Anxiety              21.19  3.20   .66**      
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia 
Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
** p < .001. 
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Table 22 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Self-Focus on Unpleasant Somatic Responses by Depressive Symptoms 
and Social Anxiety 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .17**   
   BDI       3.91  2.78   .15        
Step 2            .30  .13** 
   Social Anxiety              12.67  3.08   .45**      
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia 
Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
** p < .001. 
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Table 23 
 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of General Negative Self-Focus Factor by Social Anxiety and Depressive 
Symptoms 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .21**   
   BDI        .06   .09   .06        
Step 2            .55  .33** 
   Social Anxiety      .78   .10   .70**      
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia 
Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
** p < .001. 
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Table 24 
Hierarchical Regression Analysis Testing Prediction of Conversation Performance  by Social Anxiety and Depressive 
Symptoms 
______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Step and Predictor Variable     B  SEB   ß  R2  ∆R2 
                
Step 1            .03   
   BDI      -.04   .11  -.04        
Step 2            .06  .03 
   Social Anxiety     -.20   .12  -.22      
Note. BDI = Beck Depression Inventory; Social Anxiety = Composite of Social Interaction Anxiety Scale, Social Phobia 
Scale, and Fear of Negative Evaluation Scale 
** p < .001. 
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APPENDIX D: FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 
Hypothesized Moderated Mediation Model 
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Figure 2 
 
Rotated Component Plot for Focus of Attention Scale Items 
 
 
Note.  FAS1 = General self-consciousness; FAS2 = Awareness of negative thoughts; 
FAS3 = Awareness of positive thoughts; FAS4 = Awareness of negative 
observer-perspective images; FAS5 = Awareness of positive observer-perspective 
images; FAS6 = Awareness of unpleasant somatic sensations; FAS7 = Awareness 
of pleasant somatic sensations. 
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Figure 3 
 
Interaction of Social Anxiety and Working Memory Predicting Negative Self-Focused 
Thoughts 
 
 
